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1.1  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism 
mance, he would probably describe the period in three intervals: 
If  an economist were asked to assess U.S. postwar economic perfor- 
The late 1940s and 1950s were fairly good. Real wages grew very quickly. 
The period had three recessions but only the last one (1958-60) was se- 
vere. Inflation was low except when WW I1 price controls were lifted 
and when the Korean War began. When inflation was a problem, a year 
of recession was sufficient to end it. 
The 1960s were better. Real wages did not grow quite as fast in the 
1950s but recessions were less of  a problem. After 1963, the economy 
went on a sustained expansion. Unemployment fell more or less con- 
tinuously until 1970. And inflation did not really emerge until the end 
of the decade. 
The 1970s were awful. The 1960s expansion left an inflationary iner- 
tia so that the 1970-71 recession was not enough to bring inflation un- 
der control. Then came the 1972-73 food price explosion and the first 
OPEC price rise. They generated supply-shock inflation that was even 
more immune to recession. After 1973, productivity stopped growing 
and real wages stagnated. And then there was another OPEC price rise 
to finish out the decade. It was terrible. 
Frank Levy is professor of public affairs at the University of Maryland. 
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The assessment appears non-controversial, yet it contains a large piece 
of thin ice. Terms like pretty good, better and awfuZ imply something 
about not only the economy but about how people reacted to the economy. 
One could read the assessment as saying that people were happier in the 
1960s than in the 1950s and least happy in the 1970s. 
The most direct evidence of this proposition does not offer strong sup- 
port. Periodically, the Gallup poll (officially the American Institute of 
Public Opinion-hereafter  AIPO) asks questions with the following gen- 
eral form (e.g., AIPO 410): In general, how happy would you say that you 
are-very  happy, fairly happy, or not very happy? 
Responses to this question are contained in table 1.1. Data for the early 
postwar years through 1957 show a moderately increasing level of happi- 
ness-a  possible reflection of rising real incomes. Then a six-year gap oc- 
curs during which time the question was not asked. When the data re- 
sumes in  1963, a trend is  harder  to discern. Interpretation is difficult 
because the precise wording of the question changes in 1963, 1973, and 
again in 1977. Moreover the 1977 response-the  happiest in the series- 
comes from a poll that focused on religious habits and beliefs; responses 
for other years come from polls that focused on politics and the economy. 
When adjustments are made for these problems, the data suggest that the 
moderately rising level of happiness through the 1950s was followed by a 
roughly constant level of happiness thereafter. 
TPble 1.1  Distribution of Responses to AIPO Question 




















































Source: Various AIPO polls. 
Note: The AIPO question reads: “In general, how happy would you say you are-very 
happy, fairly  happy, or not very happy?” 
‘Read  “not happy” rather than “not very happy.” 
bRead “not at all happy” rather than “not happy.” 
=Read  “not too happy” rather than “not very happy.” 9  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
Ten years ago, Richard A. Easterlin (1974) wrote an ingenious essay in- 
terpreting these poll responses in the context of James Duesenberry’s rela- 
tive income hypothesis (Duesenberry 1952). Easterlin began by noting that 
within any poll, higher-income individuals were more likely than lower- 
income individuals to report themselves as happy. He contrasted this asso- 
ciation with his perception of a weaker association over time when real in- 
comes were rising for everyone. He also examined data from Cantril’s 
cross-national study (Cantril 1965) which showed a similar lack of associ- 
ation between a country’s per capita income and the self-reported happi- 
ness of its population. 
Together these data provided Easterlin with a basis for an application 
of the relative income hypothesis. In the application, an individual’s hap- 
piness depends on the relationship between his income and his needs, but 
his needs are heavily conditioned by what he sees around him. If incomes 
were to rise uniformly, an individual’s relative position (apart from life- 
cycle considerations) would remain unchanged, and so his individual hap- 
piness would not increase. 
Easterlin’s argument is appealing but it raises two problems. First, it 
does not explain the rising level of happiness in the early postwar years. 
Second, it leads to an overemphasis of private, versus public, consump- 
tion. As Easterlin writes: 
Finally, with regard to growth economics, there is the view that the most 
developed economies-notably  the United States, have entered an era 
of satiation. . . .  If the view suggested here has merit, economic growth 
does not raise a society to some ultimate state of plenty. Rather, the 
growth process itself engenders ever-growing wants that lead it ever on- 
ward. (1974, p. 121) 
In the Easterlin-Duesenberry argument “ever-growing wants” refers to 
additional private consumption. It is private consumption, after all, that 
provides one’s easiest comparisons with one’s neighbors. But the focus on 
private consumption ignores important history. 
The largest omission is the growth of the public sector. In 1947, all gov- 
ernment nondefense outlays accounted for 14 percent of GNP. By  1980 
these outlays had grown to 28 percent of GNP. In explaining this growth, 
the mid-1960s emerge as a particularly pivotal period during which the 
federal government instituted health insurance for the aged, the War on 
Poverty, aid to  elementary and secondary schools (with emphasis on com- 
pensatory education) and other areas, which significantly redefined the 
role of the public sector. 
To be sure, these Great Society years were distinguished not so much by 
growing expenditures as by new initiatives that would obligate future ex- 
penditures. Administration officials occasionally acknowledged the prob- 
lems they were creating for future administrations. But they felt they had 10  FrankLevy 
a rare opportunity,  a narrow window, during which they had to finish 
what the New Deal had left undone (Moynihan 1967; Sundquist 1968). 
Their opportunity came from a particularly sympathetic public. When 
government officials of  the time proposed a new initiative, they empha- 
sized its “public good” aspects: the way in which aiding the poor, the el- 
derly, or the disadvantaged would make the United States a more humane 
place for everyone. Consider, for example, Lyndon Johnson’s eloquent 
Howard University speech on equality for blacks: 
. . .  There is no single easy answer to all of these problems. 
man to provide for his family. 
equal chance to  learn-are  part of the answer. 
part of the answer. 
Jobs are part of the answer. They bring the income which permits a 
Decent homes in decent surroundings,  and a chance to learn-an 
Welfare and social programs better designed to hold families together is 
Care of the sick is part of the answer. 
An understanding heart by all Americans is also a large part of the 
answer. 
To all these fronts-and  a dozen more-I  will dedicate the expanding 
efforts of the Johnson Administration. 
. . . This is American justice. We  have pursued it faithfully to the 
edge of our imperfections. And we have failed to find it for the Ameri- 
can Negro. 
It is the glorious opportunity of  this generation to end the one huge 
wrong of  the American Nation and, in so doing, to find America for 
ourselves, with the same immense thrill of  discovery which gripped 
those who first began to realize that here, at last, was a home for free- 
dom. (Quoted in Rainwater and Yancey 1967, pp. 131-32) 
The rarity was not in Johnson’s argument,’ but in the number of people 
who agreed with it. While the majority of the population did not demand 
such initiatives, they did form, in V.  0.  Key’s phrase, a “permissive con- 
sensus” that allowed the government to implement its liberal agenda (Key 
1961, p. 33). This willingness to experiment with public consumption (in 
hopes of increasing the general welfare) is not contained in Easterlin’s 
reading of  Dusenberry’s theory. In this paper, we view the origins of  the 
mid-1960s consensus from a somewhat different perspective. 
A sensible explanation of the mid-1960s must account for both the ori- 
gins of public consensus and its subsequent demise. By most estimates, the 
1.  A more modern example of public good rhetoric occurs in remarks by Walter Mondale 
while campaigning for the Democratic presidential nomination in New Hampshire: “Most 
of us in this room are like [my mother and father]. You’re not going to get rich, but the 
chances are you’re going to have a wonderful life, and that’s where fairness comes in. You 
can lose your job. You can become ill. Kids can be born deaf and handicapped. We have to 
care. We  believe in self-reliance but we must believe in compassion. We  are not a jungle 
where just the richest and fittest  prosper. We are a community, a family, we must care for one 
another” (quoted in the New York lhes,  18 Feb. 1984, p. 7). 11  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
consensus for new initiatives peaked in 1964-66  and then began to erode. 
Government,  acting in part on inertia,  produced  occasional new pro- 
grams through the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the universalization of 
food stamps (1971) and the federal take-over of aid to the aged, blind, and 
disabled (1972) marking the end of the period. The remainder of the 1970s 
was increasingly dominated by antigovernment and antitax sentiment. 
History affords few natural experiments; thus it is not surprising that 
the mid-1960s consensus has attracted a variety of explanations. The ori- 
gin of  consensus has been ascribed to the growth of the civil rights move- 
ment, and to  the combination of John Kennedy’s assassination and Barry 
Goldwater’s candidacy (Sundquist 1968). The end of  consensus has been 
ascribed to the devisiveness of the Vietnam War and to Watergate. But 
while all of these explanations sound plausible, none by itself is sufficient. 
Consider, for example, the combined effects of the Kennedy assassina- 
tion and the Goldwater candidacy. They were traumatic experiences that 
led to a Democratic president and Democratic congressional majorities. A 
rough parallel existed in 1976 when, in the aftermath of Watergate, the 
country again elected a Democratic president with Democratic congres- 
sional majorities. Despite the parallels, Jimmy Carter had only a fraction 
of the legislative success enjoyed by  Lyndon Johnson. Part of Carter’s 
lack of success was due to his political style, but part was due to the tem- 
per of the times: If people accepted “public good” arguments in the mid- 
1960s, they clearly rejected those arguments in the 1970s. They had seen 
too many government programs in the intervening years to  retain their en- 
thusiasm. 
This dependence of current attitudes on past experience leads us to look 
for a more generic explanation of the mid-l960s, an  explanation that (like 
Easterlin’s explanation of happiness) does not rest too heavily on particu- 
lar presidents, wars, or scandals. 
One such explanation involves a slight elaboration of a public-private 
cycle recently advanced by Albert Hirschman. In Shifting Involvements 
(1 979), Hirschman argues that industrialized societies move between peri- 
ods emphasizing private material gain and periods emphasizing public 
(i.e., collective) action. The cycle’s motivation is the disappointment that 
arises when either kind of “consumption” fails to  provide the satisfaction 
it promised ex ante. 
In his writing Hirschman discusses government programs  under the 
heading of private material gain (pp. 39-46). But his examples make clear 
that he is describing those government programs that are most like private 
goods-the  public education a father and mother “purchase” for their 
children.  Conversely, the redistributive programs of the mid-1960s are 
best thought of as government extensions of Hirschman’s collective action. 
With this modification, the Hirschman cycle begins with a period of ris- 
ing consumption and rising happiness. After a time the attraction of  in- 12  FrankLevy 
creasing affluence begins to wear thin. This leads to the cycle’s second 
phase in which popular opinion becomes receptive to both public causes 
and those government programs that advance the “public good. ”  (Again, 
it is the public or collective nature of such programs that is important. A 
war  against  poverty,  properly  presented,  can  fit  the category. A war 
against potholes in one’s own neighborhood cannot.) 
If the government takes up this mandate, the public will find that the 
country is not improved as easily as they had hoped (or as the government 
had promised). Their disappointment in public goods-the  Hirschman 
cycle’s third phase-leads  to a returning emphasis on private affluence. 
In this chapter we ask whether a Hirschman cycle lay behind the mid- 
1960s consensus. Given the limits of public opinion data-gaps  in time se- 
ries, questions with changed wording-the  case for the cycle is reasonably 
strong. The result increases our understanding of the postwar American 
experience  in two ways. Not only does it give us a better explanation of the 
mid-1960s consensus, but it helps to explain why the federal government 
could look so good in the mid-1960s and so bad thereafter. And, as a final 
point, we will find that the Hirschman cycle and the Easterlin-Dusenberry 
hypothesis are not so different as they first appear. 
We will develop the argument in the three sections that follow. In sec- 
tion 1.2 we briefly review the macroeconomic history of the postwar pe- 
riod and public reaction to economic conditions. We conclude that peo- 
ple’s economic optimism rose through the 1950s and that by the late 1950s 
they appear to have put the uncertainty of the Great Depression, World 
War 11, and the Korean War behind them. This trend is consistent with the 
trend of increasing happiness during the period (table 1.1) and suggests 
that if  a Hirschman cycle existed, support for public goods should have 
grown at about this time. 
The economic data also show that people became uncertain about the 
economy at the end of the 1960s; the data became particularly gloomy 
after the food and oil price inflation of 1973-74. If a Hirschman cycle ex- 
isted, disappointment with public goods could have begun well before this 
time, but adverse economic conditions would have reinforced the turn 
back to private consumption. 
In section 1.3 we review opinion data for the existence of a Hirschman 
cycle. In the late 1950s, the most obvious examples of broad public goods 
were redistributive programs. We  find that during this period, sentiment 
in favor of such programs was high and increasing. Initially this sentiment 
did not translate into new programs as Presidents Eisenhower and Kenne- 
dy were reluctant to propose substantial new spending. Their reluctance, 
if  anything, made people more amenable to Lyndon Johnson’s public 
good arguments because there were few recent examples of public good 
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tiatives began, and our data show that not long afterwards sentiment in 
favor of redistributive programs began to  dissipate. 
In section  1.4 we  summarize our findings and apply them to under- 
standing the role of government in the 1960s and 1970s. We conclude by 
briefly reconciling the Hirschman cycle with the Easterlin-Dusenberry ar- 
gument. 
1.2  The Postwar Economic Landscape 
The experience of the Great Depression and rationed wartime consump- 
tion dictated that people would enter the postwar period with a hunger for 
private consumption. The question is, when, if ever, did this hunger abate: 
Did private consumption grow enough and become sufficiently secure to 
cause public opinion to shift toward collective welfare as Hirschman’s cy- 
cle predicts? 
We begin to answer this question by briefly reviewing the economics of 
the postwar period, with particular emphasis on the path of incomes. In 
the early years of the period, the dominant single factor was rising pro- 
ductivity. Between 1947 and 1959 the growth of output per manhour in 
private business averaged 3.3 percent per year compared to 2.5  percent 
per year for both the 1910-29 and 1930-39 periods. The high growth rate 
was important because it translated into rapidly rising real wages (table 
1.2). 
Consider a man who, in 1949, was in his late twenties. In that year his 
income would have been about $1 1,100 (in 1982 dollars). If he had looked 
to men in their late thirties to see what his own future might hold, he 
would  have  guessed  that  his  income  would  rise  by  13  percent 
($12,491/$11,070) over the next ten years. In fact, his income over 1949- 
59 would increase not by 13 percent but by 64 percent. Taken by itself, this 
Table 1.2  Median Incomes (from AU Sources) for Men by  Age, 1949-79 (d 
figures in 1982 dollars based on CPI adjustments) 
Median Income 
Male Age Groups  1949  1959  1969  1979 
20-24  $  6,998  $  8,520  $  9,618  $  8,415 
25 -  34  11,070  15,972  21,053  19,641 
35-44  12,491  18,098  23,865  24,486 
45-54  12,062  16,879  23,060  24,167 
55-64  10,430  14,505  18,997  19,956 
65 +  4,652  5,848  7,530  8,545 
Note: Median is defined over all men with at least one dollar of income from any source. 
This group typically represents 99 percent of all men in a single age group. 
Sources: Decenial Census 1950,  1960 and various Current Population Reports. 14  FrankLevy 
performance in excess of expectation should have left him feeling quite 
good. 
But there were other factors. The Korean mobilization, including the 
imposition of price controls, came only five years after World War I1 and 
rekindled fears of wartime austerity. Moreover, the demand side of the 
economy created a variety of year-to-year fluctuations. There were three 
bursts of inflation during 1946-48 (11 percent per year), 1951 (8 percent), 
and 1956-57  (4 percent). Similarly, there were three recessions in  1949 
(when unemployment reached 5.9 percent), 1954 (5.5 percent), and 1958- 
60 (when unemployment averaged 5.9 percent). 
The income figures in table 1.2 make clear that despite demand-side 
fluctuations, everything “came out all right.” But this, of course, is an ex 
post conclusion. Ex ante, people had a variety of worries. For example, 
throughout World War 11, the population was acutely aware of the role of 
war production in ending the Great Depression. They were unconvinced 
that another depression could be avoided at the war’s end. Consider the 
following National Opinion Research Center question (NORC #233,Q14) 
asked in 1945: “For the first year or two after the war, which of these 
things do  you expect: enough jobs for everybody, some unemployment, or 
a lot of unemployment?” Thirty-eight percent expected enough jobs for 
everybody, an outlook more optimistic than two years earlier, but 25 per- 
cent expected a lot of unemployment. 
Similarly, Gallup frequently asks respondents to name the most impor- 
tant problem facing the nation, a question that permits a completely open- 
ended response. Smith’s analysis of these data shows that in much of the 
postwar period, fears of war and social disorder kept economic concerns 
from the top of the list. But economic concerns did dominate the list in the 
immediate postwar period, in response to a feared second depression, as 
well  as the then current inflation and a wave of postwar labor strikes 
(Smith 1980). Together these data suggest that the economics of the early 
postwar years were good but anxious. 
The economics of the middle years were good and less anxious. Produc- 
tivity declined slightly but remained high in historical terms, so a man in 
his late twenties in 1959 would have seen his real income grow by 49 per- 
cent over the next ten years (table 1.2). Anxiety was reduced because this 
income growth was accompanied by stable demand. After 1961, unem- 
ployment declined more or less steadily for the rest of the decade, falling 
from 6.7 percent in 1961 to 3.5 percent in 1969. Moreover, this expansion 
appeared to be the result of conscious government policy-not  simply a 
lucky roll of the dice. With the wisdom of hindsight, we know the Keynes- 
ian triumph of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson depended on external 
and inherited conditions as much as on policy per se (Levy and Michel 
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discovered how to successfully run the economy, much as an engineer dis- 
covered how to  place a satellite in orbit. 
The first break in economic performance came as inflation reasserted 
itself, reaching 6.1 percent in 1969. To a large extent the inflation arose 
from Lyndon Johnson’s  decision to pay for the Vietnam War buildup 
through deficit financing. This was clearly bad economic policy, so it was 
possible to continue believing that good policy would produce economic 
success. 
The faith in good policies’ power did not survive many more years. 
When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, his first priority was to reduce 
the inflation he had inherited. Earlier postwar episodes suggested a short 
recession would do the trick. But in practice the 1960s expansion had cre- 
ated a kind of inflationary inertia, so that while the economy entered a re- 
cession in early 1970, prices were still rising by 4.7 percent per year in mid- 
1971. The difficulty of slowing inflation (even in a slack economy) caused 
Nixon to adopt wage and price controls-policies  that were accompanied 
(and weakened) by an expansion of the money supply that was designed to 
reduce unemployment in time for the 1972 election (Blinder 1979). 
The 1969-7 1 experience suggested that even the best policy could not re- 
produce a 1960s expansion automatically. Still worse news came when, in 
1973-74, the economy was hit with two supply shocks-one  in food and 
the other in oil-that  caused annual inflation to reach 11 percent in 1974. 
This shortage-driven inflation owed nothing to bad economic policy and 
no “good” policy could produce a quick cure. Initial attempts to fight the 
inflation by restrictive policies only reinforced the way in which higher en- 
ergy prices served as a substantial tax, sending large amounts of purchas- 
ing power out of the country. The country reentered recession with unem- 
ployment reaching  8.5 percent in  1975, a postwar  high. Moreover, the 
combination of  rapidly increasing energy prices and general economic 
chaos caused productivity  to collapse, a condition that would continue 
through the decade (e.g., Denison 1983). 
The combined effects of inflation, unemployment, and the productivity 
collapse can be seen by repeating our example of the man in his late twen- 
ties who, in 1969, might have expected a 13 percent income increase over 
the next ten years. In reality his income increased by about this amount; 
but most of the growth took place before 1973, and during the rest of the 
decade his income remained in a holding pattern (table 1.2). 
In summary the late postwar period suffered in three respects: income 
growth was much lower than in earlier periods, year-to-year fluctuations 
were very high, and the country had to relinquish the recently acquired 
impression that someone in Washington was in charge of the economy. 
To this point, we have discussed the postwar period in macroeconomic 
terms. If we are to examine Hirschman’s cycle, we must determine how 16  FrankLevy 
people reacted to these macroeconomic variables. In particular, we need 
to see whether there was a point at which people began to feel that they 
were doing well and expected to do still better in the future, i.e., a point at 
which they began to take income growth for granted. It is at this point that 
we  might expect sentiment to begin to shift toward collective action and 
public goods. 
Data assessing individual financial status are available from the an- 
swers to questions on financial changes that are regularly posed by  the 
University of Michigan Survey Research Center (SRC). Typical formula- 
tions read: 
Retrospective Financial Situation. We  are interested in how people are 
getting along financially these days. Would you say that you (and 
your family living there) are better off or worse off financially than 
you were a year ago? 
Prospective Financial Situation. Now  looking ahead-do  you  think 
that a year from now, you (and your family living there) will be better 
off  financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now? (Con- 
verse et al. 1980, pp. 235 and 248) 
Graphed responses to the retrospective question appear in figure 1.1. 
While responses are obviously influenced by short-term macroeconomic 
fluctuations, the data-in  particular the proportion feeling worse off than 
a year before-divide  into three periods. The first period, 1947-60,  shows 
a general downward trend in the proportion who see themselves as worse 
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Fig. 1.1.  Perception of recent changes in economic status,  1947-78. 17  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
getting better) in the 1956 recovery from recession. In 1957 through 1960 it 
averages 27 percent, nine points lower than the average of ten years earlier. 
In the second period,  1962-69,  the proportion seeing themselves as 
worse off than last year averages 19 percent, a sustained and historic low. 
This number clearly reflects the 1960 expansion. 
The third phase begins in 1970 as the economy entered recession. Here 
the proportion of people who saw a decline in financial status rose to 27 
percent in 1970-7 1, dipped briefly in the 1972 recovery (which was abetted 
by President Nixon’s wage and price controls), and then exploded to 42 
percent with the onset of the food and energy price inflations. It averaged 
34 percent for the remainder of the decade. 
Expectations about next year’s financial status are graphed in figure 
1.2. Here the proportion expecting to be financially better off shows the 
greater variation, and this proportion also divides into three periods. Dur- 
ing the late 1940s and early 1950s, the proportion tends to move slightly 
upward from 30 percent to about 33 percent. It then jumps to 35 percent 
in 1959 and 40 percent in 1960-61. 
The second phase lasts from 1964 to 1969 when the proportion expect- 
ing to be better off averages a high 38 percent. The third phase begins in 
1970 when optimism starts to falter. After a brief recovery, the proportion 
expecting to be better off  collapses to 24 percent in 1974, a level from 
which it has not fully recovered. 
In  casual  discussion-e.g.,  the  historical  sketch  that  opened  this 
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Fig. 1.2.  Expectations about next year’s economic status,  1953-78. 18  FrankLevy 
1960s, and the 1970s. The data in figures 1.1 and 1.2 suggest one impor- 
tant qualification: the economic optimism associated with the early and 
mid-1960s actually began in the late 1950s. There was much to be optimis- 
tic about. A second Great Depression had not occurred. Inflation had not 
been a serious problem since the Korean War. The Korean War itself had 
ended several years earlier, and no new war was on the horizon. And per- 
haps most important, real incomes were growing. Between 1947 and 1959, 
median family income had increased by 47 percent. The skies were not 
cloudless:  the  1958-60  recession  underlined  the  continued  impact  of 
short-term fluctuations. But even this recession did not seriously dampen 
future expectations (figure 1.2). And when people compared their situa- 
tion to that following the end of World War 11, they had come a long way. 
If Hirschman is correct, it is in the late 1950s that we should expect pub- 
lic opinion to become more favorably inclined toward what we have called 
public goods. We shall examine this proposition in the next section, but 
first we note one additional point. 
Suppose public sentiment did shift toward public goods and govern- 
ment responded to this shift with new programs.  The Hirschman cycle 
predicts that the public would become disappointed in these new pro- 
grams, regardless of any external factors. In particular, the public would 
not require an actual deterioration in their private consumption to be- 
come disappointed in public goods. But if a deterioration in private con- 
sumption did occur, the disappointment would presumably be amplified. 
We have seen in both the economic and opinion data that such a dete- 
rioration began slowly in 1970 and accelerated sharply in 1973-74.  It fol- 
lows that any reemphasis of  private consumption should have been rein- 
forced by these events. We will return to this point in the next section. 
1.3  Public Opinion on Public Goods 
America has become bored  with the poor, the unemployed,  and the 
insecure. 
It is easy to picture the welfare state as having grown steadily since the 
Great Depression. In fact, the growth was not that steady. The quotation 
above comes not from a 1980 liberal reformer but from Harry Hopkins 
(Leuchtenberg 1963, p. 274). Hopkins, writing in 1937, perceived public 
opinion to be substantially cooler to the New Deal than it had been four 
years before, and he wondered if New Deal legislation would soon be dis- 
mantled. 
We know that by the mid-1960s opinion had again shifted, and the pub- 
lic supported legislation that went substantially beyond the New  Deal. 
The question raised by the Hirschman cycle is whether a significant part 
of this shift occurred in the late 1950s when economic growth had become 
secure. Within the limits of available data, the answer appears to be yes. 19  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
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To begin with, public trust in government was high and increasing. This 
view is summarized in Miller’s Trust-in-Government Index (Miller, Miller, 
and Schneider 1980, p. 268). The index, displayed in figure 1.3, is based 
on a series of individual questions including: 
a.  How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in 
Washington to do what is  right-just  about always, most of  the 
time, or only some of the time? 
b.  Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are 
smart people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think 
that quite a few of them don’t seem to know what they are doing? 
c.  Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we 
pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it? (Miller, 
Miller, and Schneider 1980, pp. 257-65) 
In 1958, the first year in which the index was calculated, 58 percent of 
the sample fell into the “trusting” category while 11 percent fell into the 
cynical category. As shown in figure 1.3, the proportion expressing trust 
increased to 61 percent in 1964 (the next year for which data exists). But 
after 1966 the proportion would never again exceed 48 percent. Even in 
1958 all was not perfect harmony: Responses to  (c)  above indicated that 43 
percent of all respondents felt the government wasted “a lot” of money. But 
this high proportion would only grow larger as time passed. 
The progovernment sentiment in figure 1.3 implies that people regard- 
ed the government as competent. It is therefore not surprising that the 
public supported increases in a variety of broad-based government pro- 
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grams, including public education and housing,  programs from which 
typical poll respondent might immediately benefit (e.g., Converse et al. 
1980, p. 382) But if the Hirschman cycle is correct, we  should also find 
high and rising support for programs that benefit most respondents only 
indirectly-what  we have called public goods. In the late 1950s, the most 
obvious kind of public goods involved programs of aid to the poor, pro- 
grams that became an important part of Lyndon Johnson’s agenda. Exist- 
ing  poll  data provide  approximate  time-series evidence on two  such 
programs-government  provision of jobs and welfare assistance. 
Support for government provision of jobs is displayed in figure 1.4. In 
examining the data, it is necessary to examine the precise wording of  the 
question underlying each response. The December 1945 response comes 
from the question: 
Do you think it should or should not be up to the government to see to  it 
that there are enough jobs in the country for everybody who wants to 
work? (cited in Schiltz 1970, p.  189) 
The 1947 question reads: 
If it looked as if we were going into another depression that would bring 
large-scale unemployment, what do you think the government should 
do-see  to it that people don’t go hungry but let business and industry 
take the lead in solving the problems of unemployment or take full re- 
Sixty-nine percent of all respondents agreed with this statement. 
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Fig.  1.4.  Attitudes on government guarantee of a job and a good 
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sponsibility for seeing that there are enough jobs to go around and take 
whatever steps are necessary to accomplish this? (Schiltz 1970, p.  189) 
Forty-five percent of all respondents felt the government should take full 
responsibility, a fourteen-point drop in support in two years. Part of this 
drop undoubtedly reflected the different nature of the 1947 question. But 
declining support also reflected changing times. The postwar economy 
had not immediately returned to depression, and the Truman administra- 
tion was being pressed to cut back defense spending to permit tax cuts 
(Stein 1969, chap. 9). The government was not an unambiguous economic 
ally of the people. 
From  1956 (the next time the question was asked) through  1960, the 
respondent  was  shown an opinion  scale running  from agree strongly 
through disagree strongly and was asked to assess the following statement: 
The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who 
wants to work can find a job. Do you have an opinion on this or not? 
(Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1978, p. 90) 
Fifty-seven percent  agreed or agreed strongly with this  statement in 
1956, a fraction that rose to 59 percent by 1960. This statement is similar 
to the 1945 question, with an important contextual difference: In  1945 
poll respondents were facing a possible second Great Depression after the 
war and they could imagine having to take government jobs themselves. 
In 1956, a guaranteed job affected a minority of the population and bene- 
fited most poll respondents only as a public good. The high and rising sup- 
port for  government jobs in the late 1950s-i.e.,  support for public jobs as 
a public good-is  one piece of evidence in favor of a Hirschman cycle. 
In 1964, when the question was next asked, the proportion favoring 
jobs provision was cut in half, falling to 31 percent. We  shall see below 
that a small part of this “disappointment”  is explicable even though the 
Great Society was barely under way. But the more direct cause of the de- 
cline was another change in wording. The 1964 question reads: 
In general, some people feel that the government in Washington should 
see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Oth- 
ers think the government should just let each person get ahead on his 
own. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the 
other? (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1978, p. 91) 
[If the response is yes, the person is asked to give his opinions: gov- 
ernment should do it; it depends; each person should get ahead on his 
own.] 
Because the question poses the specific alternative of  getting ahead on 
one’s own, it can be expected to dilute sentiment in favor of government 
employment even without an actual shift in preference (Bishop, Olden- 
dick, and Tuchfarber 1978). Thus it is not clear how much of the 1960-64 22  FrankLevy 
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Fig. 1.5.  Government spending on welfare. 
decline in support is real. But the same question is used for the remainder 
of the series, and the eroding support after 1968 (in response to the same 
question) also is consistent with Hirschman’s argument. 
Figure 1.5 charts the proportion of the population who say that welfare 
expenditures should be increased and the proportion who say that welfare 
expenditures should be decreased. (In all polls, people can respond that 
expenditures should remain the same.) Tho researchers have constructed 
series on this question (Schiltz 1970, p.  152; Converse et al. 1980, p.  387). 
Since the two series cover largely different time periods and since they dif- 
fer (in level but not in trend) where they do overlap, both series are dis- 
played in figure 1.5 .* 
When asking questions on welfare, the element of  wording involves a 
reference to  the needy population. Ceteris parabus, “increased welfare ex- 
penditures to help the needy” elicits far greater support than “increased 
welfare expenditures” per se. In the case of the Schiltz series, the 1948 and 
1960 questions both contain references to the needy. The rise in support 
favoring such increases from 45  percent in 1948 to 60  percent in 1960 is 
not an artifact of wording, and this growing positive attitude toward wel- 
fare is consistent with the Hirschman cycle’s prediction (figure 1.5). 
2.  The difference between the series may arise from unreported differences in wording. 
While Schiltz explicitly gives the wording of the question used in each observation, Converse 
et al. 1980 uses one representative question per series, and the precise wording of each ques- 
tion cannot be readily ascertained. The impact of such changes in wording is explored in 
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Questions in the Schiltz series drop references to the needy after 1960, 
undoubtedly accounting for much of the decline in support from 1960 (60 
percent favoring increasing spending) to 1961 (35 percent). But the drop 
between 1961 and the next observation in 1964 is, as we shall see, consis- 
tent with Hirschman’s conception of disappointment. 
The few observations of the Converse series show a similar pattern in- 
volving a high level of support for increased welfare spending in 1960-61, 
a much lower level of support in 1969 (the next time the question was 
asked), and a still lower support in 1973. 
Such data as exists, then, supports the development of a consensus for 
redistributive programs in the late 1950s and a deterioration of this con- 
sensus by the late 1960s. This pattern is consistent with a Hirschman cycle, 
but several points require further elaboration. 
Beginning the development of consensus in the late 1960s did not mean 
that government initiatives immediately began to grow.  Dwight Eisen- 
hower felt strongly that he should hold down federal expenditures (Stein 
1969, chaps.  11,  12); later John Kennedy assumed office with much rhe- 
toric but little in the way of specific redistributive proposals. In one sense, 
the caution of these presidents amplified Hirschman’s mechanism. Had 
Eisenhower or Kennedy tried an ambitious new intervention-say,  a war 
against illiteracy-that  failed, people might have become more skeptical 
about what the federal government could accomplish. But in fact, no such 
counterexamples were available, leaving the majority of  the population 
amenable to Lyndon Johnson’s description of his agenda. 
A second amplifying factor was the nature of the 1960s economy. In 
section 1.2 we saw how the economy expanded continuously after 1961. 
The expansion created both rising real incomes and rising government 
revenues. Government programs could be financed with foregone tax cuts 
rather than new taxes. This meant that Lyndon Johnson’s agenda appar- 
ently cost little, making it even more attractive. 
But as  the agenda unfolded, disappointment, in several varieties, ulti- 
mately set in. One unexpectedly early source of disappointment was the 
urban riots. Given the civil rights revolution a significant part of John- 
son’s agenda (including Head Start, etc.) was seen as a way to aid blacks. 
The urban riots of 1964 and 1965 were a first sign that any war on poverty 
would not be as easy or safe as it first appeared (at least to people outside 
the South). These riots are in part responsible for the rapid declines in sup- 
port seen in figures 1.4 and 1.5. 
A second source of disappointment, directly implied by Hirschman, 
came from boredom.  The media-in  particular,  television-thrive  on 
tragedy and movingly describe the hungry and the sick. This description is 
an important factor in the public good benefits that accompany programs 
of government assistance. But once a program is initiated, assistance be- 
comes less interesting, particularly if it is successful and its recipients are 24  FrankLevy 
in less dire straits. A hungry child receiving his first free school breakfast 
is, in television parlance, a “good visual.” A well-fed child receiving his 
fiftieth school breakfast is not. Through this process, even the best redis- 
tributive programs lose support over time. 
A final source of disappointment was expense. In section 1.1 we noted 
that  Johnson administration officials were aware that their  initiatives 
might become increasingly  costly in future years. The reality was worse, in 
several ways, than they had anticipated. Medicare (for the elderly) and 
Medicaid (for the poor) together substantially increased medical cost in- 
flation and program expense. In the early  1970s,  Congress tied  food 
stamps, Social Security, and other benefits to consumer prices, just before 
the 1973 food price explosion and the first major oil price increase. While 
wages failed to keep pace with this inflation, these benefits did (by law). 
This meant that the program costs became more expensive absolutely and 
took a greater relative share of output. 
These varieties of disappointment had real consequences because while 
some programs were tied to consumer prices, others including Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, required specific legislation for any 
increases. This legislation was more responsive to public attitudes. Thus 
Peter Gottschalk has shown that all cash transfers (including  Social Secur- 
ity, etc.) generally rose as a percentage of national income during the 
1970s. But income-tested cash transfers began the decade at 1.1 1 percent 
of national income, peaked at 1.34 percent in 1975, and declined there- 
after until they equaled 1.05 percent in 1980 (Gottschalk 1982). 
In retrospect, much of the disappointment in public goods appears un- 
avoidable. A public highway continuously provides services to a large 
constituency. But a redistributive program reaches a broad constituency 
only as a public good and so, as we have argued, attains its highest support 
when it is initiated. Put simply, no such program could be as consistently 
exciting as Lyndon Johnson said it would be. 
But although the disappointment was partially unavoidable, it was also 
due to bad luck. The most obvious element of bad luck was the food and 
oil price inflation of 1972-74 and the subsequent collapse of productivity. 
Without these events, real incomes in 1979 would have been 25 to 30 per- 
cent higher (about $29,000 rather than $24,000 for the thirty-five- to fifty- 
four-year-old men in table 1.2). The burden of government expenditures 
would have been lighter. And perhaps more important, people would have 
been more secure about their personal economic situation. 
At the end of section 1.2 we argued that if during the Hirschman cycle 
such insecurity arose, it would only reinforce the return to private well- 
being. We close this section with a piece of  evidence on this point drawn 
from the attitudes of college freshmen. These attitudes have been meas- 
ured annually since 1966 in polls conducted under the auspices of the 
American Council on Education (The American Freshman 1967). Every 
poll includes a set of questions about life goals, which the respondent is to 25  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
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rate on a four-point scale running from “essential” to “not important.” 
One  of these goals is “being very  well off  financially” and a second is 
“helping people in need.” Figures  1.6 and  1.7 show the proportion of 
male and female students, respectively, who rated each goal “essential” or 
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Because the polls begin in 1966, we would expect that the sentiment in 
favor of helping the needy to have already peaked. This is in fact the 
case-the  series for both sexes shows a slight downward trend over the pe- 
riod. Conversely, the emphasis on doing well financially shows a dramatic 
turn-around in 1973. For men, this proportion had shown a slightly  down- 
ward trend over the late 1960s and early 1970s; but in 1973 alone it jumped 
from 5 1 percent to 64 percent and, with one dip, continued increasing to 
69 percent by the end of the decade. The corresponding proportions for 
women show a similar pattern with a jump from 30 percent in 1972 to 46 
percent in 1973. These freshmen did not massively disavow the goal of 
helping people in need, but the dramatic drop in its relative importance is 
consistent with the idea that Hirschman’s cycle was amplified by a bad 
economy. 
1.4  A Conclusion and Reconciliation 
The data reviewed in section 1.3 suggest that a Hirschman cycle began 
in the late 1950s and extended through the 1970s. The cycle’s shift from 
private material gain to public goods helped motivate the opening in pub- 
lic opinion that was seized upon by Lyndon Johnson. The subsequent dis- 
appointment with many of the Great Society programs helps explain why 
this consensus ended. 
Beyond explaining the mid-1960s  period the Hirschman cycle also pro- 
vides insight into how government could look so good in the 1960s and so 
bad thereafter. Part of the reason, of course, was economic. We have seen 
that most of the 1960s was spent in a sustained expansion for which the 
government took more than its share of credit. But equally important was 
the brief popular romance with public goods. People had high hopes for 
what government might accomplish, and the government was able to re- 
spond with new initiatives. The government, in short, was in a particular- 
ly good position to give people what they wanted. 
Government’s situation in the 1970s was an almost mirror image. The 
decade was spent in economic stagnation for which government took a 
disproportionate share of blame. The 1960s enthusiasm over (yet-to-be- 
initiated) public goods had been replaced with disappointment. But in re- 
sponse to this disappointment, there was little government could do. Gov- 
ernment, of course, has a harder time reducing programs than letting 
them grow. And in the case of the United States in the 1970s, the indexa- 
tion of many program benefits made reductions nearly impossible be- 
cause they would require reneging on highly visible promises to keep real 
benefits intact. Here, then, government was in a particularly bad position 
to  give people what they wanted. 
Thus Hirschman’s cycle helps us to understand the preconditions of the 
Great Society and, more generally, the shifting sentiments toward and 27  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
away from government over the postwar period. But if Hirschman’s anal- 
ysis is useful, there remains the question of whether Easterlin’s descrip- 
tion of the postwar period is wrong. 
The answer, it appears, is not that Easterlin’s theory is wrong but that it 
is too cryptic, a comparative static argument that ignores the movement 
from one equilibrium to another. Consider again Easterlin’s argument. 
Happiness depends upon one’s relative income. If incomes rise through- 
out society, average happiness should remain unchanged. 
The argument may hold for (static or dynamic) equilibrium but when 
incomes are changing in unexpected ways other standards may come into 
play. For example, one may judge one’s current income by one’s past in- 
come or by what one expected to  be making in the current period. We have 
argued that the growth of real income over the 1950s was much better than 
what people expected at the end of World War 11. This performance in ex- 
cess of expectations can explain the rising trend of happiness during the 
period (which a pure relative income interpretation cannot). In this inter- 
pretation,  only after economic growth was taken for granted  did the 
growth of happiness slow. 
When viewed in this light, the Easterlin argument and our interpreta- 
tion of the Hirschman cycle are quite similar. It is well known that within 
any sample, richer individuals are more “public regarding” and have a 
greater taste for public goods as we have defined the term (e.g.,  Schiltz 
1970, chap. 6). 
In Hirschman’s argument, as the population grows richer, it becomes, 
on average, more public regarding. But this attitude lasts only for a cer- 
tain period of time, after which the population returns to its prior empha- 
sis on private consumption. Here, too, one can argue that people tempo- 
rarily confuse a rise in absolute income with a rise in relative status and 
modify their behavior as long as the confusion persists. 
This consideration of dynamics does not completely reconcile the two 
theories, but it moves them toward a common message: Economic growth 
may not induce permanent changes in either the average level of society’s 
happiness or society’s attitudes toward public goods.  But  permanent 
changes are not the only test of importance: If economic growth can in- 
duce temporary changes in these attitudes, the consequences for society 
can still be profound. 
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COmIllent  Lee Rainwater 
Frank Levy’s chapter opens for exploration an important area at the bor- 
derline between the social psychology of well-being and the macroeco- 
nomics of growth. He explores the trade-off between public and private 
goods, between politics and markets, in the determination and the distri- 
bution of resources for well-being. 
This is relatively uncharted territory. As one explores the empirical ba- 
sis for assessing relative levels of  subjective well-being it becomes appar- 
ent how extremely mushy these variables are and how ambiguous must be 
any effort to test a model such as the one Levy develops. Indeed a model 
of the abstractness of the Hirschman (HM) cycle is perhaps impossible to 
test empirically given the validity and the reliability of the data-gathering 
techniques available to us. But nevertheless an effort to array systemati- 
cally the evidence, such as it is, can open the way hopefully to more suc- 
cessful efforts in the future. 
In this discussion I would like to deal with only three of the many inter- 
esting issues raised by the chapter. First, the question of happiness meas- 
ures and Easterlin’s law. Next, I will raise some alternative possibilities for 
explaining the decline in support for government initiatives which the pa- 
per charts. And finally, I will raise some questions about the utility of the 
Hirschman cycle for helping us understand the pattern of government ex- 
penditures over the past two decades. 
So far, systematic analyses of responses to  happiness questions confirm 
Easterlin’s assertions that economic growth does not seem to increase the 
expressed happiness of the general public. In the most intensive examina- 
tion of this issue by James Davis, the author summarizes his findings as 
follows: 
Data from 17 U.S. national surveys (1948-1975)  are analyzed to  resolve 
Easterlin’s  paradox-reported  happiness  is  correlated  with  socio- 
economic status, but there seems to be no secular increase in happiness 
despite great socio-economic progress since World War 11. A four vari- 
able (race, education, marital status, and happiness) categorical flow 
graph model is estimated for the period  1952-1975 with these conclu- 
sions: blacks and the non-married are distinctly less happy, the better- 
educated are slightly more happy. The increase in levels of education is 
Lee Rainwater is professor of sociology at Harvard University. 30  FrankLevy 
shown to produce a statistically significant increase in happiness but the 
increase is (1) offset by negative trends from greater proportions of ex- 
married and blacks, (2) is diluted by erratic residual fluctuation and (3) 
is very small, something like  O.OOO5 per year. (Davis 1975) 
Davis comments that one might say that in the entire post-World War I1 
period a little over two million more Americans have been made happy. 
Davis was not able to use income as a variable because of problems of 
missing data and different categorizations of the variable so he uses edu- 
cation as a proxy. The results, however, suggest that the sameness we see 
can be a result of compensating changes in the population. We know that 
something like that has happened with respect to  income distribution with 
changes in family arrangements, pushing the distribution in a more une- 
qual direction while other forces have created greater equality within the 
dominant family type of married couples. 
Thus it may not really make too much sense to use a happiness measure 
for the total population as an aggregate measure for any kind of refined 
analysis. The stability of the proportion of the population that is happy 
over a long period of time and across countries is a striking finding; Eas- 
terlin was right to call our attention to how it challenges a lot of assump- 
tions about relationships of affluence and happiness. I think that to go 
further than that one will have to mess around with the details of exactly 
who is happy, and changing patterns over time in who is happy. This is 
particularly the case in connection with the ideas behind the HM cycle be- 
cause the reality of the welfare state is not one in which the same individ- 
uals trade off between public and private goods but rather one in which 
some individuals give up private goods in order that others may have pub- 
lic transfer income. Thus, it would be very interesting to look at changes 
over time in happiness measures for wage receivers versus transfer receiv- 
ers, as this interacts with age. 
A great deal of the work on satisfaction with life seems to suggest that 
individuals evaluate their life situations primarily in terms of the social sit- 
uation close at hand. Thus satisfaction with family, with neighborhood, 
with social contacts are crucial in determining overall life satisfaction, as 
is satisfaction with job. Satisfaction with more distant aspects of life, like 
local and national politics, takes very much a back seat (see Andrews and 
Withy 1976; Campbell, Converse, and Rogers 1976). Thus any theory will 
be incomplete if  it cannot specify the connections between macroevents 
and people’s experiences  in their daily lives with family, friends, neighbor- 
hood, and jobs. 
There is the further worrying fact that no objective characteristics seem 
to have a strong causal relationship with happiness and satisfaction meas- 
ures. The best predictors of overall satisfaction are other attitudinal fac- 
tors about specific aspects of one’s life situation. Easterlin’s theory does 31  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
not run into problems with this complexity because it simply asserts that 
people evaluate their situations comparatively with reference to the world 
they know, and that so long as one’s relative standing in society does not 
change, one’s reasons for being satisfied or unsatisfied are not likely to 
change. 
The second set of concerns I would raise about the HM cycle theory as a 
historical explanation of public attitudes toward government during this 
period has to  do with the possible powerful effect of noneconomic factors 
on public perceptions and the role of government. The HM cycle theory 
predicts support for public spending through the 1960s and then a decline 
in support in the 1970s due to both satiation and the end of  the Golden 
Age. However, public attitudes toward government initiatives in the 1960s 
were extremely mixed. While there was strong support for expansion of 
some kinds of programs like Social Security from a fairly early time after 
their initiation there was strong opposition to other kinds of  spending. 
The War on Poverty had a very mixed reception from its very beginning. 
It seems to me that disenchantment with the Great Society can be better 
understood as a reaction to the massive social changes instituted during 
the 1960s by a variety of forces, than as a redressing of the balance in the 
trade-off between public and private goods. The centuries-old system of 
race relations was shattered by the civil rights revolution  of  the early 
1960s. That left a lot of white people very unhappy, as anyone who re- 
members the broad support for George Wallace knows. The life-style rev- 
olution that followed rapidly on the civil rights revolution and was sym- 
bolized  in different ways by  the flower children and the new  kinds of 
political activism similarly challenged traditional views concerning what 
was right and proper in society. Since all of these changes were reinterpreted 
as in some sense a product of  government activity, or at least as encour- 
aged by liberal government, it is not surprising that already by the mid- 
1960s one found  resistance  building  to government-engineered  social 
change. We know that there was an extremely rapid change in the percep- 
tion of what government was doing for blacks during the mid-1960s. 
I think this rapid buildup of negative views during the 1960s is difficult 
to rationalize in terms of the HM cycle because it comes much too early 
for satiation to have set in. 
The Hirschman cycle is presented as a theory of welfare backlash. But 
Hirschman himself doesn’t seem to have thought of his model of shifting 
involvement that way.  He discusses government services in his section on 
consumer disappointment,  relates backlash to frustration with services 
generally, and seems to reserve the idea of the public for “public life” 
rather than public consumption (Hirschman 1982, pp. 34-45). 
There has of course been a great deal of comparative research in this 
area in the past decade by people like Harold Wilensky, Peter Flora, and 
Walter Korpi, and Gosta Esping-Andersen. Thus Hirschman’s cyclic the- 32  FrankLevy 
ory, as stated, applies to all of the advanced industrial democracies. In 
evaluating the theory, one needs to look at the phenomenon of public 
goods satiation comparatively. 
I must say I do not find the theory particularly attractive. It is extremely 
abstract. I do not believe that political actors react to  the abstract categor- 
ies of  public versus private goods except in a rhetorical or ideological 
sense and that is not at all what the HM cycle model is talking about. It 
deals with behavioral responses to  the experience  of a greater or lesser rate 
of growth in public expenditures. Most of the work on the growth of the 
welfare state (which is the principal element in the growth of government 
expenditure in all of the advanced industrial democracies) suggests that 
political actors think in terms of particular programs and make decisions 
to expand or contract particular kinds of programs. After all, the major 
components of growth in the post-World  War I1 period are pensions, 
health care, and education. To support a theory like the HM cycle one 
would have to demonstrate its operation concretely with respect to these 
kinds of programs.  In other words, to talk of trade-off between public 
and private consumption expenditure pushes one toward treating these 
two as relatively homogeneous categories, while the nitty-gritty of the 
political-economic development of programs suggests that that is not the 
case. 
To the extent that the Hirschman cycle responds to patterns of econom- 
ic growth then one would expect a great deal of similarity in patterns of 
welfare state growth in these countries. What we find however is a great 
deal of diversity. There is no strong correlation between the endpoint and 
the starting point. The welfare state leaders of 1950 or 1960 are not neces- 
sarily the same as those of 1970 or 1980. Countries have experienced gov- 
ernment expenditure growth at vastly different rates, and the timing of the 
periods of greater or lesser growth have been different in different coun- 
tries. 
As soon as one focuses on a number of countries rather than just on the 
United States, numerous contradictions to the theory appear. For exam- 
ple, if satiation with public consumption is produced by higher spending 
levels, how can it be that opposition to spending seems strongest in the 
United States, with the lowest level of social program coverage and spend- 
ing, and less strong in Germany and France with very high levels of spend- 
ing and program coverage (Coughlin 1982, p. 152; Wilensky 1976)? 
If there is an HM cycle, it has a very different history in each of the ad- 
vanced industrial nations despite the fact that their economic histories up 
until the mid-1970s have shown remarkable similarities. We do know that 
within the range of some eighteen advanced industrial democracies no 
strong relationship exists between the rate of economic growth and the 
growth of government expenditures. 33  Happiness, Affluence, and Altruism in the Postwar Period 
The slowing down of the rate of  growth, which has affected almost all 
countries, began in roughly 1975, but I think this is much more easily ex- 
plained by the economic crisis than by a more complicated theory of satia- 
tion. It should be noted also that if one takes the end of the Golden Age as 
1973, over some fifteen nations for which there is complete data on aver- 
age government expenditures grew twice as fast as a proportion of GNP in 
the period  1974-80  as in the period  1960-73.  On average, over half the 
growth of government expenditures as a proportion of GNP between 1960 
and 1980 took place after 1973. And this was true of such diverse coun- 
tries as Great Britain,  Sweden, France, Australia,  and Japan. By  1980 
only two countries, the United States and Germany, had actually reduced 
government expenditures as a proportion of GNP from the 1975 level. 
For these various reasons therefore, I think the HM cycle theory will not 
survive as an explanation for changes in public support for public goods, 
or as a hidden factor sustaining happiness at its constant level. 
On the other hand, the kinds of explorations that the chapter makes in 
the murky borderland between economics and social psychology are im- 
portant because only if efforts are made to move beyond theory to empiri- 
cal testing can we hope to improve our understanding of how social and 
economic forces form preferences, and how those preferences in turn play 
back into the political economy. 
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